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Falling Nations
Introduction
The European Union (EU) is a supranational organization whose goal is the integration of
the continent economically and to some extent politically. It began with the Treaty of Rome
signed on March 25, 1957 by Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands to create an “ever-closer union,” with the desire to ensure economic and social
progress.1 Under this treaty, the EU was known as the European Economic Community or the
European Communities because of the treaty’s economic focus until 1993 and the Maastricht
Treaty, which changed the name of the region from the European Communities to the European
Union in order to reflect the expansion of its focus beyond economic matters.2
Currently the EU is made up of 28 states and has developed with the overarching goal of
creating peace through freedom, security, and justice.3 The institutions that have developed as
the EU continues to grow are primarily responsible for overseeing EU policies and ensuring the

1

Treaty of Rome, Preamble, Mar. 25, 1957; The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Treaty of
Rome: Europe 1957, (last updated Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-ofRome.
2
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, supra note 1; The Editors of Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Maastricht Treaty: Europe 1991, (last updated Jan. 15, 2019),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Maastricht-Treaty.
3
EU in Brief, Europa.EU, (Apr. 29, 2019), https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-inbrief_en.
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continued joint progress of member states as one voice. However, because the EU consists of
different sovereign nations there is always potential for disagreement or discord, which can have
the effect of decreasing the democratic consensus of the union and cause conflict or splintering
in its common ideals.
The EU as an organization is founded on a series of treaties and is thus conceptually
similar to the United Nations or NATO. However, in practice the EU has far more control and
access to public policy. 4 The political leaders who decide on the direction of the EU’s agenda
are the main decision makers, so those countries with a larger voice in this sphere control the
outcome of the principles.5 Procedurally, all laws of the EU stem from treaties created by and
between member countries and act as the constitution. The treaties define the roles and powers of
both the countries and the EU institutions, and no treaty can be amended without the approval of
all the member states.6 The Treaty of Lisbon signed on December 13, 2007 and made effective
on December 1, 2009 amends the two prior governing treaties, the Treaty on European Union
and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (formerly the Treaty establishing the
European Community), and forms the constitutional basis of the EU.7 The goal of this treaty is to
be “more efficient and responsive to the needs of a modern globalized society.”8

4

EU Facts Behind the Claims: Democracy, FullFact, (April 25,
216), https://fullfact.org/europe/eu-facts-behind-claims-democracy/.
5
Id.
6
European Union Law: EU Treaties, (last updated Mar. 4, 2019),
https://libguides.law.illinois.edu/EU/treaties.
7
Lisbon Treaty, 2019, available at Thomson Reuters Practical Law,
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/1-5008458?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1.
8
Rossana Deplano, The Citizens of Democracy: Participation for Integration in the European
Union After the Lisbon Treaty, 19 No. 1 Hum. Rts. Brief 8 (2011).
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Before the Treaty of Lisbon, democracy in the EU centered around individualized
participation rather than “the collective dimension of European citizenship” as citizens were
limited to petitioning the governing institutions or applying for individualized review with the
ombudsman (an official appointed to investigate complaints against maladministration).9 Now
there is increased transparency in the language, and the changes in reorganization of the prior
treaties allow for “balance between intergovernmentalism and federalism.”10 The Lisbon Treaty
also contains provisions to help encourage the creation of laws that take all of the states into
consideration by giving each country the ability to challenge laws they think should be a sole
concern of the states.11
Despite the threat of disunification, the European Union has managed to remain a
successful institution. But in today’s increasingly polarized climate there are heightened tensions
surrounding the position of the EU over each sovereign entity, and issues of the past – like
immigration – may have polarizing effects and become a factor of disintegration within the EU.
Currently, France is one of the EU’s greatest success stories even through its own experiences
with political and immigration crises that affect the EU. Poland and Hungary serve as two of the
younger success stories, but in light of recent democratic backsliding they also create the need
for an in-depth analysis to see how the European Union can continue to survive on its shared
ideals.

9

Id.
Ingolf Pernice, Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action, 15 Colum. J. Eur. L.
349 (2009); Stephen C. Sieberson, Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority
Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon, 50 Va. J. Int'l L. 919 (2010); and Matej
Avbelj, Treaty of Lisbon: An Ongoing Search for Structural Equilibrium, 16 Colum. J. Eur. L.
521 (2010).
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Democracy, supra note 15; Hatton and Sonny, supra note 15.
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The Depths of the Democratic Deficit
The EU’s success is actually the result of successful bargaining. Essentially its governing
process and acquiring of dedicated EU participants is based on countries desiring membership as
a result of their economic and security needs. Once willing to make the necessary sacrifices in
reforming their political and social practices, they also have the chance to become a part of the
world stage in a meaningful way.12 The common governance encourages the transfer of
democratic norms, which serves to bind the countries together and their reliance on each other
helps make the system work.13 The process is interesting because it suggests an elitism despite
the fact that the EU’s mission is working towards a better unified Europe. Achieving this
transformative buy-in is what allows the EU to claim “successes” with countries like Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.14 The ongoing democratic and political deterioration of
some these “success” countries, however, suggests that the EU is losing its ability to convince
these states that the EU is a necessary step to becoming successful or achieving certain goals. It
seems that now domestic conditions within the country and how the citizens feel personally
about their daily lives has a much greater impact on a country’s willingness to follow EU policy
than achieving the ideals of greater worldwide democracy. This falls in line with current world
trends: while society still champions globalization and greater connection across jurisdictions,
there is an increasing push to discover your roots and regain pride in the aspects of identity that
make us unique.

12

Joshua Gray, The Challenges and Successes of EU Democracy Promotion Policies,
(November 24, 2015), https://www.e-ir.info/2015/11/24/the-challenges-and-successes-of-eudemocracy-promotion-policies/.
13
Id.
14
Id.
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Backsliding then becomes an easy occurrence because the EU cannot force the
participating countries to conform to the EU’s ideals indefinitely.15 The ease of this rejection has
become apparent in these democratic deficit examples because while the main strategy of the EU
is offering common ideals and the opportunity to play on the world stage, if these countries
decide to focus on a new direction and can reconcile with the relative decrease in access to the
international sphere and economic benefits, there is very little keeping them in the EU.16 While
the EU offers significant benefits, sometimes it is not enough if the individual countries feel
neglected or inauthentic.
Maintaining democracy is an ongoing challenge as the world continues to integrate and
the demands of citizens become more visible through the media and social networks.17 The
current citizens of the EU have a disheartened democratic spirit, which means the EU has a fatal
flaw in its system because its citizens see it as being removed from them, a telltale sign in
government that a backlash may be on the horizon, as is clearly the case in Poland and
Hungary.18 To increase support for its continued presence, the EU will have to take notice of
areas of interest to the people, like equality, security, and corruption.19 It will also have to make a
more conscious effort to include the member states’ national governing bodies in decisionmaking that effects every nation individually.20
The EU does have one directly elected body, the Parliament. But, its powers are weaker
than all the other institutions because its only substantive power is the ability to propose

15

Id.
Id.
17
Corrado Pirzio-Biroli, Five Ways to Fix the EU’s Democratic Deficit, (March 28, 2018),
https://www.friendsofeurope.org/publication/five-ways-fix-eus-democratic-deficit.
18
Id.; Democracy, supra note 15; and Hatton and Sonny, supra note 15.
19
Pirzio-Biroli, supra note 74.
20
Id.
16
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amendments to laws and adopt a position on them.21 Furthermore, so few citizens vote in the
elections and those who do tend to take a nationalist perspective rather than considering what
will effectively influence the EU, which skews the representation of Parliament in the same
direction.22 Still, the body is at least firmly grounded within the democratic process.
In contrast, many feel that the EU Commission, which is filled by direct appointment,
fails to meet the democratic standard and lacks legitimacy because it falls completely outside the
democratic electoral process and it is only accountable to the EU Parliament.23 This belief stems
from the fact that the European Parliament has the final say on all candidates of the Commission.
The EU Commission president is nominated by the European council and selected by the
Parliament. The EU council subsequently nominates the other Commission members along with
the president and the members are voted in by Parliament.24 Though citizens of each country
elected the Parliament, it is a common view that politicians often serve their own interests, which
causes many to believe that the members of the Commission do not necessarily have the views of
the people in mind.
Another glaring issue fueling the fire of the deficit is the EU’s continued private sessions
and refusal to make some of these records public, particularly within the European Council and
the Council of Ministers.25 This allows “the powerful actors in [the] system [to] push for further
integration in order to increase efficiency without paying much attention to democratic
legitimacy.”26 This in turn causes backlash because EU citizens believe failed transparency

21

Democracy, supra note 15; Hatton and Sonny, supra note 15.
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
EU Facts Behind the Claims: Democracy, supra note 21.
26
Frank Schimmelfennig, The Normative Origins of Democracy in the European Union: Toward
a Transformationalist Theory of Democratization, 2(2) European Political Science Review, 21122
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suggests a lack of attention to their concerns and creates more separation from the government
that is supposed to be working for them. While ongoing international support for the EU
strengthens its legitimacy and promotion of its democratic norms, the EU still pays greater
attention to the outside world and its core countries rather than to the bulk of its constituents.27
The EU is made up of different political communities rather than a single democratic
entity which naturally makes it more difficult to accomplish certain political aspirations.28 So
while the system is embedded in popular thinking and created through popular production it
lacks a centralized power despite the presence of the EU. This is in part due to the presence of
the many institutions that make up the EU, but the more damaging part of the system stems from
its reliance on the participation of the member countries, which in the case of Poland and
Hungary proves precarious.29 Thus, “the weakness, domestication, and anti-integrationist
orientation of EU-related protest politics points to deeper structural problems of EU
democratization.”30
The crux of this issue is that the different states do not consider themselves a “single
political entity,” instead they are all party to the same societal and political beliefs. “Less than
fifteen percent of the EU population identify themselves exclusively or primarily as Europeans,
whereas around 40 percent have an exclusive national identity.”31 This allows for the possibility

233 (2010), (discussing a transformationalist theory of democratization),
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Schimmelfennig/publication/232005076_The_norma
tive_origins_of_democracy_in_the_European_Union_Toward_a_transformationalist_theory_of_
democratization/links/00b49520cd6609e9b6000000/The-normative-origins-of-democracy-inthe-European-Union-Toward-a-transformationalist-theory-of-democratization.pdf.
27
Models of EU Democracy Promotion: From Leverage to Governance, Democracy Promotion
by Functional Cooperation, supra note 20.
28
Schimmelfennig, supra note 81, at 3-5.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 6.
31
Id. at 6-7.
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of splintering and destroying the system.32 Schimmelfennig states that mobilization for
democracy is much easier if there is a strong collective identity.33 This provides insight to the
success of the democratic deficits in Poland and Hungary because their leaders were able to
foster a sense of oneness amongst the people.34 It suggests that EU constitutional and democratic
conflicts between institutional actors stem from “the distribution of political rights and
competences in the liberal EU community.”35
Scholars began to recognize the decline in national power in the 1990s relative to the EU
executive institutions. And this trend has increased since the mid-1980s as the governing treaties
are being continually reformed and giving the EU more power.36 Scholars believe that the voter
turnout to EU elections is indicative of attitudes towards the system, and turnout has always been
low. This negative attitude toward the system is due in part to the recognition of the European
people that their “preferences on issues on the EU policy agenda at best have only an indirect
inﬂuence on EU policy outcomes. In comparison, if the EU were a system with a genuine
electoral contest to determine the make-up of ‘government’ at the European level, the outcome
of this election would have a direct inﬂuence on what EU ‘leaders’ do, and whether they can
continue to do these things or are forced to change the direction of policy.”37

32

Id.
Id. at 7-11.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 11.
36
Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response
to Majone and Moravcsik, 44(9) JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 533-562 (2006)
(discussing democratic polity)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/4991696_Why_There_Is_a_Democratic_Deficit_in_th
e_EU_A_Response_to_Majone_and_Moravcsik.
37
Id. at 536.
33
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The distance that frustrates citizens is due to the lack of common understanding of how
the EU works so they cannot identify with it or recognize it as a truly democratic system. This
creates animosity towards the system that overshadows the positive work its doing and leaves it
vulnerable to disarray as it is experiencing now.38 A further problem is that EU policy is skewed
towards the interests of capitalists and powerful member countries because they have the ability
to organize and lobby at the EU level as opposed to the ordinary citizen or weaker country who
can only have the resources to operate on a more national or diffuse level.39 Because of this,
some scholars feel that “the EU lacks democratic legitimacy not so much because it stifles
political participation, but because its policies are biased against particular interests that are
consensually recognized as legitimate.”40
Although the EU has structures in place to allow for participation through elections and
commentary, the issues leading to the deficit revolve around the fact that citizens see no outcome
or effect as a result of their participation.41 Without support and active participation from its

38

Follesdal and Hix, supra note 90.
Id.
40
Andrew Moravcsik, Is There a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics? A Framework for
Analysis, 39(2) Government and Opposition 336-363 (2004) (discussing an ethical critique of
global governance), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-andopposition/article/is-there-a-democratic-deficit-in-world-politics-a-framework-foranalysis/1F89743B351981A9D449B44E7B1397D6.
41
Pippa Norris, Representation and the Democratic Deficit, European Journal of Political
Research 273-282 (1997) (discussing process, representation, and accountability),
https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Articles/Articles%20published%20in%20journals_files/R
epresentation_Democratic_Deficit_1997.pdf; and Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, EU
Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic
Development and Transnational Exchange, (June 1, 2008),
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1465116508089085.
39
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citizens, the democratic structure and political control of the EU will continue to dissipate and
potentially decrease in legitimacy as well.42
Cause of Backsliding
The European Union’s institutions exist as a supranational governing body to the
individual sovereignty of 28 different countries. While each of these countries has a common
stake in the well-being of the others, they each have individual interests, like those concerning
immigration, that do not necessarily align. Because of this, dissatisfaction and civil unrest is
becoming increasingly apparent within some of these countries and has led to democratic
backsliding as the citizens and political parties try to recapture their sovereign identity. The
beginnings of these democratic deficits are causing fissures in the EU’s control.
The pillars of the EU democracy are equality, representation, and participation.43 The
idea behind them is to bring coordination to and establish a common mindset between member
states in order to create a strong community by showing their resoluteness through their common
connections. All the roles of the EU countries are under the various treaties and reiterated in the
Treaty of Lisbon, which is supposed to unite and make similar their legal regimes.44
Unfortunately, similarity between the regimes under leadership at the formation of the treaty
does not guarantee their similarity into the future.
Aziz Huq, a University of Chicago law professor and accomplished scholar, wrote that
“democracy is not a simple concept...it relies on drams of transparency, legality, impartiality, and

42

Claudio Castro Quintas, Assessing the Democratic Deficit in the EU: towards a Participatory
Approach, 14(1) RIPS 63-82 (2015) (discussing citizens’ perceptions of democracy)
file:///C:/Users/sport/Downloads/2418-11418-2-PB.pdf.
43
Id.; The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, (2019),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.1.3.pdf; and The Three Pillars, (2019),
https://pages.uoregon.edu/euro410/eutoday/organizations.php?menu.
44
Id.
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constraint…these are promoted by a range of different laws, norms, institutions, and individual
loyalties. All of these rarely vanish all at once. Their evaporation is ineffable and easily
missed.”45 The concern is that democracy can diminish in a slow and uneven process. In recent
cases, this has occurred when an entity becomes consumed with retaining its power rather than
paying attention to its ideals. In regard to the instances of democratic backsliding within the EU,
they seem to have been in part a reaction to the EU’s self-appointed role as a superseding
governing body, rather than recognizing its role as the glue between independent sovereign
bodies.
One major issue all EU countries encounter is changes to their immigration policies,
which are traditionally seen as central to sovereignty: states have an absolute right to let people
into their country. As an internationally recognized body and player, the EU has certain
geopolitical positions that may differ from the positions each member state would carry
individually.46 Still, the EU prides itself on having a “forward-looking and comprehensive []
immigration policy based on solidarity.”47 One way it achieves this is by allowing member states
to dictate the amount of people let into their countries, particularly concerning immigrants
entering for work, or what the EU refers to as regular immigration.48 However, the EU
determines the conditions that qualify an immigrant to enter or obtain legal residence in a

45

Zack Beauchamp, It Happened There: How Democracy died in Hungary, Vox Media, Inc.,
(Sept. 13,2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/9/13/17823488/hungarydemocracy-authoritarianism-trump.
46
Peter Vermeersch, EU Enlargement and Immigration Policy in Poland and Slovakia, 38(1)
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 71, 71-88 (2005) (discussing EU immigration policy in
critical borer areas),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222562957_EU_enlargement_and_immigration_policy
_in_Poland_and_Slovakia.
47
Marion Schmid-Drüner, Immigration Policy, Europa.EU, (May 2019),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/152/immigration-policy.
48
Id.
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country.49 Immigration specifically is a policy issue that touches a lot of different concerns, all of
which were once traditionally in the sole control of each nation. However, with the current status
of the EU, there is an underlying requirement of compliance.50 As a result, though the EU often
supports the actions of its members with regard to third-country nationals, EU law does not
intentionally work to harmonize itself with national laws and regulations.51 Instead, the EU
focuses on the political and socialization goals of those creating or influencing policy at the EU
level and member states are expected to find a way meet these goals.
The development of integrated approaches to immigration, asylum, and general migration
has been ongoing since the 1980s and has been a strong piece of the EU’s ability to set a
supranational agenda and influence legislation and policy.52 And due to people’s natural nomadic
tendencies, immigration has always been a hotly debated topic in Europe. In attempts to create
peace and control over the migrant issues between countries, the EU began debating a new
controversial treaty that would govern the movement of people around the EU. The treaty,
known as the Schengen Agreement, was signed on June 14, 1985 with the intent of creating a
cohesive Europe with no national borders known as the Schengen Area.53
There are currently 26 states who have signed on to be a part of the Schengen Area,
including four who are not members of the EU. Members of the EU who are not involved may
have unresolved political issues that prevent them from joining, no desire to eliminate their

49

Id.
(Especially since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Tampere European Council (1999)).
Vermeersch, supra note 5 at 72.
51
Schmid-Drüner, supra note 6.
52
Vermeersch, supra note 5 at 73.
53
Schengen Agreement, (last updated Oct. 18th, 2018),
https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-agreement/).
50
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border controls, or do not meet the conditions for application to the area.54 Still, admittance to
the EU comes with Schengen-related provisions including increasing border security and
reforming judiciary or law enforcement systems in line with Schengen rules.55 France and
Germany were the first countries to lead constructive conversations about the free movement
concept in June of 1984 when they brought the topic to the EU Council and set to work defining
the conditions of the project.56 However, the principles of the Schengen Agreement were not
fully incorporated into the EU’s legal framework until 1999 in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which
helped define further roles of the EU Parliament.57
As part of the agreement, several member countries wanted to facilitate guaranteed free
movement for people within the countries that have signed on by removing all internal borders
and instead having one eternal border.58 This became a topic of debate because member states
were divided on whether the free movement should apply only to EU citizens or include non-EU
nationals as well. Instead of recognizing and addressing the sensitivity of this issue and its
potential backlash, the EU pushed on, and the debate quickly culminated in the creation of a
territory known as the Schengen Area without any internal border checks allowing any person to
freely pass.59 Every participating member of the Schengen Area follows one set of rules for
border control, visas, and asylum requests around the external border. Members are also required

54

Id.; and The Schengen Area and Cooperation, (last updated Mar. 8, 2009), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al33020.
55
Sean M. Topping, Defying Schengen Through Internal Border Controls: Acts of National
Risk-Taking or Violations of International Law at the Heart of Europe, 48 Geo. J. Int'l L. 331
(2016).
56
Schengen Agreement, supra note 51.
57
Id.
58
The Schengen Area and Cooperation, supra note 52. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al33020.
59
Id.
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to cooperate and coordinate their police forces and judicial services in order to facilitate open
lines of communication and maintain proper security.60 The Schengen Area truly took effect on
March 26, 1995 when France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain
together decided to remove their internal national border checks.61
While the Schengen Area promotes unity throughout the participating EU member states
and associated countries, it also carries a threat to national security.62 Lax or ineffective security
check points can expose every involved country to unwanted individuals, and a large influx of
refugees can test the limits of the security measures with regards to population control and
ensuring that countries are equally sharing the burden of support.63 If states “lose faith in the
security of the external borders and the security within neighboring Member states, the crisis
threatens to destabilize the Schengen [A]rea and further the disillusionment of relations between
Member States.”64 In anticipation of this, part of the common rules of the area allow member
states to reinstate their border controls for a limited period of 30 days (or the foreseeable duration
of the threat) in times of crisis if they can show that it “is a serious threat to public policy or
internal security.”65 In 2015, the Syrian refugee crisis tested that system. As hundreds of
thousands of refugees poured into the Schengen Area, many participating states began to
reinstate internal border controls in order to protect their nationals and social systems.66 This
reaction cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Schengen Area and the ability to ensure that

60

Id.
Schengen Agreement, supra note 51.
62
Kaela McCabe, Schengen Acquis: The Development of the Right to Free Movement of Persons
Within the European Union Legal Framework and the Necessary Reforms to Adapt to Evolving
Security Threats in the Region, 7 Creighton Int'l & Comp. L.J. 107 (2016).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
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countries could rely on a single border system.67 Every sovereign has a duty to its people and in
any situation where the people feel threatened countries will try to support their citizens before
others.68 Because refugee crises and immigration carry elements of the unknown, they are
threatening and cause distrust and frustration. This particular migrant crisis revealed the
precarious counterbalance between cooperation and national sovereignty that will always exist in
the EU.
The problem is that countries are being required to transfer their power to the EU and
marginalize their domestic concerns creating massive backlash.69 One of the reasons for Brexit
was that British voters felt that they did not have an identifiable influence in the EU, yet the
institution had a strong control over their daily lives.70 They framed it as an accountability issue,
one where the EU was not responding the wants and needs of its component nations, which
caused them to want to leave in order to regain faith in the foundations of democracy.71
One of the major problems causing the democratic deficit of the EU is its inaccessibility
to citizens. Many consider it too complicated to become involved with and there have been no
efforts towards transparency or educational development to help them understand or feel like
they can participate in the process.72 The program developed to overcome this is known as the
Citizens Initiative. Though newly introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon, the initiative has legal basis

67

Id.
Topping, supra note 53.
69
Vermeersch, supra note 5 at 73.
70
Gary Younge, The Shambles of Brexit Diverts Attention from the EU’S Democratic Deficit,
The Guardian, (Mar 9, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/09/brexiteu-democratic-britain.
71
Id.
72
Democracy, Europa.EU, (last visited April 29, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/human-rights-and-democratic-governance/democracy_en;
and Lucy Hatton and Anna Sonny, Democracy in the EU, Civitas Institute for the Study of Civil
Society, (June 2016), https://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/CIT5.-Dem.pdf.
68
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in both the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Founding of the European Union,
both precursors to and integrated into the Treaty of Lisbon.73 The program aims to improve
participation by providing a citizens’ committee platform to increase direct access to the
development of EU policies and law.74 Once a collective of at least one million citizens supports
a legislative proposal they are given access to the EU Commission on equal footing with the EU
Parliament or the EU Council.75 Unfortunately, the initiative has not been enough to rectify the
situation as it faces many legal and technical obstacles in proposing and integrating citizens’
thoughts and opinions.76 This means that while there has been an attempt to encourage and give
citizens the access they need, the logistics of providing these programs has not been effectively
implemented, suggesting that the EU will continue to face suspicion from the general population.
Furthermore, the topic of immigration in the EU is becoming increasingly politicized,
especially in conversations surrounding issues of citizenship and naturalization.77 In the past, the
integration of immigrants had not been an issue because states had free reign on the citizenship,
naturalization, and integration of people within their own countries. However the superseding
international immigration process of the EU has influenced immigration in a way that makes it
more difficult for individual nations to exercise control because the EU makes common policies
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Treaty on European Union, Article 11(4), Dec. 13, 2007; and Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, Article 24(1), Mar. 25, 1957.
74
Democracy, Europa.EU, (last visited April 29, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/human-rights-and-democratic-governance/democracy_en;
and Lucy Hatton and Anna Sonny, Democracy in the EU, Civitas Institute for the Study of Civil
Society, (June 2016), https://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/CIT5.-Dem.pdf.
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Deplano, supra note 8.
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Schmid-Drüner, supra note 6.
77
Martin A. Schain, The State Strikes Back: Immigration Policy in the European Union, 20(1)
The European Journal of International Law 97-101, 93-109 (2009) (discussing immigration in
EU countries). http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/20/1/1776.pdf.
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for every country to ensure peaceful and harmonious integration in the greater European area.78
Now the EU policies on immigration are governed by its supranational politics in order to
“secure” the process and ensure its efficiency and benefits for the entire community rather than
being influenced by national offices.79
Gold Standard
The idea of increasing democracy within the EU came from scholars and is supposed to
harmonize the domestic and international sphere, using the principles of the individual states to
bridge the actions and laws of the group.80 This becomes difficult in the EU context because the
EU is trying to unite 28 individual domestic and international countries with differing identities,
whereas other democracies have a much more focused battle, because at the very least their
citizens exist under at least one unified identity.
France is considered one of the EU’s shining examples of the continuing success of their
system, particularly with attention to immigration. In the 1970s, France was one of the first EU
countries that started to experience large influxes of permanent immigration, prompting attention
to migrant populations, their intent to stay, and the need for integration policies.81 Germany
followed close behind as the biggest recipient of asylum seekers, with other countries like
Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK also receiving large numbers of migrants. Following this,
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there were political strides to restrict entrance into the EU and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty
worked to ease intra-EU migration movement so countries could better share the influx.82
Overtime, immigration controls have become much more politicized in order to –
theoretically – take the perspectives of all affected parties into account. As one of the core EU
countries, France has always had a hand in policy determination.83 From the mid-1970s, France
has created its immigration policy with a firm hold on its sovereignty. Its ideals of family
migration benefits and regularization for non-French citizens became a model for the integrated
EU policies.84
However, while France is also subject to compliance with EU standards of migration and
asylum, they also enjoy a bit a leeway in their integration of such issues.85 During the 2015
migrant crisis affecting the entire European area, France had the luxury of letting their domestic
politics be a guide through the process in order to find a balance between EU and its own
preferences.86 In reality though, “co-operation on the development of a more harmonized
immigration policy has been very limited in Europe.”87 Part of the issue is that there has been no
attempt to establish a structure geared towards facilitating the harmonization or expansion of
immigration policies between states. Instead decisions regarding the states and policies are made
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with and through the support and control of the core EU decision makers and decision-making
bodies.88
Examples of Democratic Backsliding
Poland
Poland became an EU success story after the adoption of its current constitution in 1997
and its official transition from communism to democracy and acceptance into the EU in 2004.89
Since that time, Poland, like other EU countries, has struggled with the relationship between
being a sovereign and submitting to another source of control.
As with many other nations, Poland experienced migration challenges that serve as an
example of the difficulties of balancing the EU and a sovereign government. In 2003, Poland
was asked to align its migrant and asylum polices to those of the EU, issue visas for citizens of
neighboring states, and create special visas for ethnic Poles who may not have had any prior ties
to the country aside from lineage.90 Though not extreme measures, these policies were required
of Poland rather than created in concurrence with its interests, wants, and needs.
As the EU has grown, Poland has always been one of its border states, making the
immigration policies of Poland of particular interest to the EU.91 In recent years this has caused
the EU to ask Poland to tighten border security in order to fight illegal immigration, restrict
conditions of entry, and consolidate asylum systems in accordance with EU policy.92
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Unfortunately, the majority of these adjustments have little to do with domestic issues faced by
Poland. 93
In the 1990s, Poland experienced its first immigration challenges under the polices of the
EU. Poland created refugee centers for one thousand North African migrants being deported by
the Swedish authorities. This was followed by efforts to create visa-free entry for Poland’s
citizens in Germany.94 To institute that system, Poland signed a readmission agreement with
Germany where Poland committed to readmitting “third-country nationals who had illegally
entered the Schengen [A]rea from Poland.”95 Poland subsequently agreed to a series of other
comparable bilateral agreements with its other neighboring countries.96 While humanitarian and
arguably beneficial for Poland’s image, their adoption of each of these agreements and
immigration strategies was a direct result of EU policy requirements to promote cooperation
linked to core member state interests.97 As a result Poland actually had little if any say on the
details of these agreements.98
Under the EU’s quotas for asylum seekers and refugees during the 2015 migration crisis
resulting from conflict in the Middle East, Poland was slated to take in seven thousand people.99
Citing the fact that integration has failed in golden states like France because of “no-go” areas,
Poland refused to admit their agreed upon quota of asylum seekers in order to avoid internal

93

Id.
Id. at 80.
95
Vermeersch, supra note 5 at 80.
96
Id.
97
Vermeersch, supra note 5 at 86.
98
Id.
99
Roger Cohen, How Democracy Became the Enemy, NYTimes, (April 6,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/opinion/sunday/orban-hungary-kaczynskipoland.html.
94

Adereti 21
social disputes.100 Their decision was a reflection of both the leadership’s and citizens’ position
of contempt for the EU’s façade of solidarity, and their stance served to preserve their own
ethnic identity both culturally and religiously.101
Unfortunately, the slow developing unrest associated with this position culminated when
Jarosław Kaczyński, promising a reconstruction of Poland in the image of the Polish, came to
power in 2015.102 His focus was not solely on helping Poles reclaim control of their own
democratic destiny, but reshaping Poland according to his ideals. The changes in Polish
democracy have continued with attacks on the judiciary that are essentially eroding all
semblance of political independence.103 All of which is being done under the guise of creating
efficiency within the courts. The Kaczyński government has taken the initial collective support
and transitioned into silencing its critics in order to give the illusion of continued support for
their beliefs on how to better increase the sovereignty of Poland.104 One of the most recent
changes, forcing older judges to retire, is seen as a rollback of the independent judiciary and
demonstrates their contempt for western principles of democracy because it suggests a transition
to more politically impressionable courts as younger judges are trying to establish their careers
through good graces rather than using wisdom to guide decision making.105
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Since this time of “protection” for its citizens, the Polish government has made moves to
control the media, further dismantle the independent judiciary, and neutralize unsympathetic
NGOs and public criticism.106 These new policies have been initiated despite public and
international pressure and are specifically designed to eradicate Poland’s democratic systems.107
Kaczyński was able to take control and implement these measures because he came into
government at a time when Poles were dissatisfied with their relationship to the EU and Poland
had a strong economy.108 Since gaining control Kaczyński has been able to convince and gain the
support of a subset of the population, which “legitimizes” the propaganda that is allowed to
surface in the media.109
The initial response of the European Commission, the main administrative institution of
the EU, was to take Poland to court to remedy the democratic backsliding, specifically the
appointment process for new judges and the retiring of old judges.110 Unfortunately, the irony of
the measure may serve to continue to fuel one of the mechanisms causing these issues. A
favorable decision for the European Commission allows them to achieve their goals of
“protecting Poland’s independen[ce],” but also forces Poland to overturn its own laws.111 This
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further highlights the issue of the EU acting as a superior body to sovereign nations and
potentially ignoring the desires of those citizens who support Kaczyński and Poland’s
“liberation.” In one sense it subverts the political process or dream that democracy succeeds
partially by letting the people of a country keep their own government in line by voting out the
leadership they dislike.112 Though there are questions of the feasibility of this in Poland (and
Hungary) due to the authoritarian government control taking hold, removal of Kaczyński by a
popular vote would be the type of social-political change democracy champions.
Hungary
In its democratic debut, between 1990-2010, Hungary was seen as one of the models of a
young, stable democracy.113 However, the lack of attention to the individual needs of the country
have left many Hungarians feeling dissatisfied with the practice of EU democracy even if not its
ideals.114 The changes leading to their democratic backsliding began as creating an “ethnic
understanding of the nation,” which essentially involved excluding minorities and immigrants,
and focusing on Hungarian nationals.115 It was a calculated resistance to the EU’s attempts to
implement a quota system essentially forcing member states to accept asylum seekers and
migrants.116
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Hungary has never had a large immigrant population with only 5.2 percent of its people
being foreign born.117 However, Hungary is one of the stops located on common migration
routes from the Middle East and South Asia.118 As a result, during the mass migrations in 2015
because of conflicts in the Middle East, citizens saw the issue of immigration as a top priority for
themselves and the EU. That year, Hungary received more asylum applications relative to its
population than any other member state.119
This is essentially what gave Viktor Orbán his foothold. The EU’s decision to encourage
migration and ask border states to open their countries increased the feelings of uncertainty on
how Hungary would be allowed to maintain its sovereignty and ensure its citizens specifically
thrived.120 Jumping on the rising public anxiety about regulating and containing migration,
Orbán exacerbated the tension by suggesting a loss of Hungarian identity and culture as a result
of the increased migration.121 Specifically, the EU had passed a mandatory migrant relocation
plan and assigned refugee quotas to each country. Orbán challenged the decision in court and
stepped up Hungary’s border protection efforts.122 Through this he was able to gain public
support by expressing his willingness to fight for Hungary’s right to independence from the
“open borders” approach.123
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In more drastic turn of events, Orbán began restricting democratic participation within
the country.124 And unfortunately Hungarian citizens saw this as a positive step as it follows the
misguided rhetoric that Hungary is regaining control of itself. The initial perceptions within the
country saw the changes as a reasonable way to counter EU control. But the increasing changes
associated with journalism restrictions, government control of media outlets, and removing the
independent judiciary began elevating the idea of an authoritarian regime and undermined
essential democratic freedoms.125
Orbán’s goal was to create a national narrative of victimhood and cast himself as the hero
by putting Hungarian citizens’ will over the democratic balancing of the EU (and that of
Hungary itself).126 The powerful community support against the EU’s dictation of how Hungary
as a nation should run by dictating their “sovereign” choices like immigration policies is what
has led the citizens of the country to support Orbán’s plan to reclaim Hungary and likely
unwittingly his subsequent dictatorship.127
A Way Forward
One glaring concern is the speed with which Poland and Hungary were able to decline
from their model democratic status.128 This suggests that democracy as defined by the Western
world never really took deep hold in European countries like these two.129
There is no doubt that the 1990s onward has witnessed the transformative power of the
European Union and its ability to reconstruct the different government structures of several post-
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Communist states.130 However, it is also clear that the EU’s ability to persuade these countries to
implement the nonnegotiable requirements of democratic elections, minority rights, and market
economies relied heavily on the potential economic and political costs of being excluded rather
than actual buy-in to the principles.131 Because of this, there was no indication that these
countries were or are actually embracing “the norms underpinning liberal democratic
institutions,” creating huge vulnerabilities in the system.132 Essentially the EU bet that the power
of its institutions would supersede the individual countries desires.133 Still it does not appear that
the issue is a failure of the inherent construction of the EU institutions, but a superseding support
for identity.134
In response to both Poland and Hungary, the EU has initiated its disciplinary process,
Article 7, which is designed to prevent member states from breaching what the EU considers to
be its core values.135 The process was invoked against both countries in fear of their reversion of
democratic institutions and ideals that member states are supposed to emulate. The ultimate
consequence of this would be a suspension of Poland and Hungary’s voting rights in the EU.136
The more likely way to solve this is for the EU to gain the support of the citizens of each
country. Currently, the EU lacks the support of the general public because it largely ignores the
interests of the noncore countries. However, with the public on its side, the EU can garner
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support for maintaining cohesive laws like those of immigration and foster an environment
where their ideals of cooperation and a common mindset can continue.
Some scholars believe the change the EU needs to make is a more transparent decision
making process so citizens can feel more involved or understanding of the policy directions in
addition to other features like ex post reviews and scrutiny of private actors and rules to protect
minority interests.137 While it cannot be feasibly expected that the EU conform policy to the
whims of all of its citizens – partly because of the differences in opinion across Europe, and the
theoretical belief that citizens lack the well-groomed pedigree and corresponding expertise
assumed of governmental leaders – it should display some indication of attention to their
concerns.
The ultimate source of the EU’s current crisis with this deficit is a crisis of trust.138
Citizens do not consider the EU to be strong piece of their identity because they do not
understand it beyond its basic role. This causes suspicion of its inner workings and discontent in
the decisions that come from it. “This pattern will continue until the average EU citizen will be
able to intervene directly in the policy-making processes of the EU in a more significant way.”139
To overcome this deficit of democracy, the EU will need to create “an institutional revolution to
give European democracy a second life,” which means that “an effective civic European Identity
is required.”140 “The feeling of belonging to a common community is an essential requisite for
encouraging greater participation of European citizens in the system, as this affection will make
people feel that their opinions are taken into account to a greater degree.”141
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Success in this endeavor will require citizens across the member states to agree and
believe that they are involved in the structure. That will lead to increasing willingness to
participate and support all of the EU’s functions, and hopefully put the EU on the right path.142

142

Quintas, supra note 96.

